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BLOCK RATE PRICING OF
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AN ANALYSIS OF WELFARE EFFECTS
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Bert Zwart*
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Block rate pricing of piped water in Indonesian cities has a progressive
structure: the marginal price paid increases with the volume of demand.
This paper estimates household water demand in Salatiga city using the
Burtless and Hausman model, and finds that its distribution is not
unimodal—that data cluster around kinks. The main estimation results
are a price elasticity of approximately –1.2 and an income elasticity of
0.05. These elasticities are mutually dependent. The estimated model is
used to investigate the social welfare consequences of a shift to uniform
pricing. The principal beneficiaries would be large households, which are
not necessarily wealthy. While replacing the complex rate structure by a
uniform marginal price would have positive effects on average welfare,
the equity consequences would be small. To improve equity, water
companies could reduce installation fees, giving low-income households
access to water connections, or reinvest profits in network expansion to
unserviced areas.
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74 Piet Rietveld, Jan Rouwendal and Bert Zwart
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, about 40% of the Indonesian urban population (27 million people)
had access to piped drinking water, while in rural areas, where alternative
water sources such as wells and rivers are more abundant, it was available
to about 10% of the population (10 million people). The quality of the
piped water system is rather low: water must be boiled because it is not
safe to drink; about 40% of it disappears because of leakages; and supply
is frequently interrupted in many places.
Piped water in Indonesia is supplied by regional water companies
(PDAM: Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum), a decentralised government
monopoly. There are about 300 PDAMs in the country. Their profits
usually form a small part of the revenue of regional governments
(kabupaten and kotamadya), but in some cases a PDAM provides an
important source of income for the local administration (IRC 1997). Data
from PDAM reports indicate that 70% of all PDAMs have negative net
revenues when depreciation is taken into account. Thus in the majority
of cases it is only when depreciation costs are not accounted for in a proper
way that a money flow can occur between the PDAM and the regional
government.
In terms of privatisation, clean water has lagged behind other services
such as transport (toll roads), electricity and telecommunications, where
private investors have played an important role. Large investments would
be needed to bring about a substantial increase in the penetration of piped
drinking water. The public sector seems unable to realise such an intensive
investment program, and private sector involvement will be necessary
to speed up investments in water supply. One of the bottlenecks appears
to be the pricing of water. Governments are reported to keep prices low
enough to be affordable to as many households as possible (IRC 1997),
which reduces the attractiveness of water supply as an investment
opportunity for the private sector.
Each PDAM has its own system of prices, with various schemes for
households, commercial activities and the public sector. A special feature
of the pricing system for households that is shared by the various PDAMs
is that it is progressive: the larger the volumes consumed, the higher the
marginal price paid. Table 1 gives an example of the pricing structure of
the PDAM of the city of Salatiga in Central Java. The table shows that the
price paid for the first cubic metre (m3) of water (Rp 215/m3) is only half
that paid for each additional m3 when large quantities of water are
consumed (Rp 430/m3). This implies the use of block rate pricing.
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75Block Rate Pricing of Water in Indonesia: An Analysis of Welfare Effects
The progressive price structure used by Indonesian PDAMs is a special
example of multi-part pricing, a practice whose origins are traced in Pigou
(1920), in which the marginal price of a good is different for various levels
of demand. This system is only practicable when the consumer can be
identified and resale is difficult. Both conditions are met in the case of
water demand. In the well known textbook example, a profit maximising
monopolist would introduce a price structure with a variable part to cover
the marginal cost and a fixed part to absorb the consumer surplus (Coase
1946; Varian 1989; Brauetigam 1989; Gravelle and Rees 1992). This form
of pricing is often used in sectors with large economies of scale leading
to high overhead costs, but its use is not restricted to such cases: it could
arise with any cost structure. This pricing strategy is consistent with
maximising both profits and efficiency. Efficiency is guaranteed, since the
price is equal to the marginal cost, so that the well known problem of
underconsumption due to a high monopolistic price is avoided. Profits
are maximised via introduction of the fixed charge.1  Thus any problems
one might have with this form of monopolistic price setting would have
to be with the equity aspect (fairness of income distribution) rather than
with efficiency. This standard form of multi-part pricing leads to a
decreasing average price being paid by consumers: the more they consume,
the lower the average price. In the Indonesian case the opposite occurs:
the price structure used here implies an increasing average price.
We conclude from the above that profit maximisation is apparently
not the objective of Indonesian public water companies. Why then do
these public monopolists apply a progressive price structure? A basic
reason is that PDAMs wish to promote equity: high-income households
TABLE 1  Price Structure with Increasing Marginal Prices, Salatiga, 1994
Segment Marginal Price Interval
(Rp/m3) (m3)
1 215 (0–10)
2 280 (11–20)
3 370 (21–30)
4 430 (30 +)
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76 Piet Rietveld, Jan Rouwendal and Bert Zwart
consuming large volumes of water pay higher prices than households
consuming small quantities. PDAMs are conceived of as firms with a
social mission, which apply cross-subsidies from rich to poor households
(IRC 1997).
There is a further possible reason for the choice of pricing structure.
Water companies may wish to avoid the situation where households share
a connection to the piped water system; as we will see below a certain
proportion of households have adopted the practice of using a connection
jointly with their neighbours. By taking individual connections,
households face lower marginal prices, but this has, of course, to be traded
off against the fact that the installation fee must be paid twice.2
The application of a progressive system of block rate pricing has
special consequences in terms of economic theory and econometric
estimation. Figure 1 illustrates the kinked  budget constraint of consumers
facing block rate pricing, in which water purchases in excess of the kink
at Wk are at a higher price than purchases up to that level. Given strictly
convex budget constraints like those shown here, a substantial number
of consumers may be expected to find their optimal consumption bundle
at the kink—i.e. consuming Wk of water—even though they have different
utility functions or different income levels. (Figure 1 is explained in detail
below.)
From an econometric viewpoint the problem with kinked or non-
linear budget constraints is that the marginal price paid becomes a
function of the quantity consumed. Thus when one estimates a demand
function one cannot apply the standard approach in which quantity
consumed is the dependent variable and marginal price is an independent
variable. A treatment of these estimation problems can be found in a study
by Burtless and Hausman (1978), who have developed econometric
methods for analysing piece-wise linear constraints. The literature is
reviewed in Moffitt (1986, 1990), and an econometric application is
provided by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995).
In this paper we focus on the equity aspect of the non-linear pricing
system. To analyse the efficiency aspects, one would need data on cost
structures to be able to compute the long-run marginal costs of water
supply. However, data on cost structures are not available in this case.
Thus the discussion of efficiency questions can only be carried out in
theoretical terms. As indicated above, a two-part pricing system performs
well from an efficiency perspective when the cost structure consists of an
access fee in combination with a variable charge equal to marginal cost.
This efficiency criterion cannot be attained with the progressive price
system used by Indonesian water companies. Thus, we conclude that
the standard two-part price structure described above has the potential
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77Block Rate Pricing of Water in Indonesia: An Analysis of Welfare Effects
to be efficient (i.e. when the price equals the marginal cost), whereas the
progressive price structure used by the water companies does not have
this potential.
The reason we address the equity issue is that the progressive price
structure may be expected to perform better in equity terms than the
two-part price system with a uniform marginal price, because it would
allow poor households that consume little water to pay lower prices.
The question is whether the progressive price system has sufficient
positive equity effects to make it an attractive alternative to a potentially
more efficient uniform pricing strategy (assuming that price equals
marginal cost).
FIGURE 1  Consumption Optima for Individuals with Different Preferences and
Incomes under Block Rate Pricing of Watera
yv
y
Wk Water
Other
good
aFor an explanation of variable names, see discussion of equations below.
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78 Piet Rietveld, Jan Rouwendal and Bert Zwart
In the present paper we estimate the demand function for piped water
consumed by urban households, using the econometric techniques
mentioned above. We report on some data issues before discussing the
estimation results. On the basis of the demand function, a welfare
economic analysis is then carried out in order to determine whether a
progressive price system is advisable from an equity perspective. The
analysis is based on a household survey conducted in Salatiga.
DATA
The study carried out in Salatiga, a medium-sized city in Central Java
with about 100,000 inhabitants, suggests that about 50% of the households
have direct access to piped water (table 2).
A private connection to the piped water system is not the only way
PDAM services are consumed: 6% of households get their water from a
neighbour who has a private connection, and 8% obtain PDAM water
via a community water terminal.3  The rest of the population gets its water
from wells and rivers. Water vendors play a negligible role in Salatiga,
although they are significant in large cities like Jakarta, where the supply
of water of sufficient quality from wells and rivers is small (Crane and
Daniere 1996). The figures shown in table 2 relate to the main water source;
some households use more than one source. The data presented in the
table are based on a sample of 951 households. In our analysis of demand
for piped water we focus on the group of 50% having a private connection,
because it is only for this group that we know the quantities of water
consumed.
TABLE 2  Distribution of Households According to Main Water Source, Salatiga, 1994
Main Water Source Share of Households
(%)
Piped water, PDAM (private access) 50
Piped water, PDAM (via neighbour) 6
Collective water terminal, PDAM 8
Well 34
River 2
Source: Supramono and Wijayanto (1995).
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79Block Rate Pricing of Water in Indonesia: An Analysis of Welfare Effects
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics of relevant variables, and
table 4 examines some relationships among these variables. It can be seen
that the distributions of water demand and income are highly skewed to
the right. The correlation between demand and income is low, as is that
between household size and income.
Some results on water demand not found in the table are of interest.
About 37% of the data are equal to 10, 20 or 30 m3/month, and thus lie on
one of the kinks. This fact may be due to rounding errors, but gives some
extra support to the use of the Burtless and Hausman model.
TABLE 3  Descriptive Statistics of Demand Related Variables, Salatiga Water Study,
1994
Demand/Month Income/Month Size of
(m3) (Rp)a Household
Mean 18.70 166,872 4.827
Standard deviation 10.69 105,998 2.121
Coefficient of variation 0.571 0.635 0.439
Median 17 150,000 5.0
0.25 quantile 10.0 100,000 3.0
0.75 quantile 22.0 200,000 6.0
Minimum 7.0 30,000 1.0
Maximum 100 650,000 15.0
Skewness 3.411 1.738 0.914
aIn March 1994, the exchange rate was approximately Rp 2,000/$.
TABLE 4  Correlations between Demand Related Variables, Salatiga Water Study,
1994
Income Size of Household
Demand 0.060 0.438
Income 0.114
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80 Piet Rietveld, Jan Rouwendal and Bert Zwart
ESTIMATION RESULTS
To estimate water demand, we use the Burtless and Hausman method
(1978) for analysing choice behaviour under piece-wise linear constraints.4
The price structure shown in table 1 would lead to a specification with
three kinks, at 10, 20 and 30 m3. However, we make the following
extension. Since demand is bounded from below (by zero) and above
(by budget restriction), we add two kinks to the boundaries of the interval
of feasible demand. Table 1 contains the values of the kinks, segments,
and corresponding marginal prices pm,1, …, pm,4.
The following specification for the logarithm of water demand is used
in the estimation procedure:
  ln ln lnq X p ym v= + + + +β γ δ α ε (1),
where q is water consumed in m3 per month, X is a set of household
features, pm is the marginal price of water per m
3, and yv is virtual income.
Virtual income is defined as the income of a household conditioned on
the marginal price it pays for water. In figure 1, virtual income is measured
along the vertical axis: for households consuming less than Wk units of
water, virtual income is equal to actual income. However, for those
consuming more than Wk units virtual income is higher, as indicated by
the intersection of the extended steeper segment of the budget constraint
and the vertical axis. Virtual income is higher than actual income for
such households (measured in terms of the other good) because the lower
infra-marginal price paid for the first Wk units of water permits greater
expenditure on the other good than would be possible at the higher
(uniform) water price. For further details on the use of virtual incomes in
this context we refer to Moffitt (1986). The parameters β, γ and δ are
parameters to be estimated. The parameter α is a random coefficient that
is introduced to take care of heterogeneity among households. It reflects
taste differences: some households are more inclined to consume water
than others. The parameter ε represents a common measurement error.
In standard econometric estimations of demand functions, α and ε cannot
be distinguished. However, in the present context of kinked budget
constraints, the two stochastic components are distinguishable (Moffitt
1990).
Table 5 gives the estimation results (standard errors between brackets).
The number of household members is denoted by H. D is a dummy
variable with value one if a household has an extra water source (usually
the river or a well) and value zero elsewhere. Unfortunately, no data are
available on whether neighbours are co-consumers of the water.
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81Block Rate Pricing of Water in Indonesia: An Analysis of Welfare Effects
Water consumption depends strongly on household size: the
coefficient of 0.526 means, for example, that in a household with three
persons, consumption is 24% higher than in one with two persons
[(3/2).526 = 1.24]. This result is no surprise, given the rather high correlation
between water consumption and household size shown in table 2.
The value of the coefficient of D differs significantly from zero when
a likelihood ratio test is performed. Water demand is 22% lower when an
extra water source is available. The only coefficient that does not differ
significantly from zero is that for virtual income yv. This is also the
conclusion when the product ln(pm)ln(yv) is left out of the specification.
This product term is significant and adds extra richness to the model, in
the sense that the price elasticity is no longer constant. Table 6 shows
various values of the price elasticity for a given value of (virtual) income.
The mean price elasticity is –1.176. Very low-income households appear
to be slightly more sensitive to price increases than higher-income
households. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that water demand in
Salatiga has a strong dependence on the price of water. The values of the
TABLE 5  Household Water Demand: Estimation Results, Salatiga, 1994
ln(q) = 8.764 + 0.526 ln(H) – 0.220 D – 1.280 ln (pm) + 0.501 10
–6 ln(yv) + 8.604 10
–3 ln(pm)ln(yv)
(1.22) (0.099) (0.142) (0.235) (0.348)10–6 (1.164)10–3
α ~ N( 0, 0.5582 ) ε ~ N( 0, 0.0202 )
(0.036) (0.0052)
Log-likelihood = –681.06
TABLE 6  Price Elasticity as a Function of Income
Virtual Income Price Elasticity
(Rp)
0 –1.280
30,000 (minimum) –1.191
166,872 (mean) –1.176
650,000 (maximum) –1.164
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82 Piet Rietveld, Jan Rouwendal and Bert Zwart
price elasticities obtained here are higher (in an absolute sense) than the
range of about –0.3 to –0.9 mentioned by Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989)
for the US. On the other hand Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) arrive at an
elasticity of about –1.6 for households in Texas, and mention some other
studies yielding elasticities of water demand clearly higher than one (in
an absolute sense). Most of the studies in this field relate to the US, where
indoor water consumption is thought to be rather price independent,
whereas outdoor consumption (for watering lawns) is much more price
dependent (other studies pertain to Europe and Australia). This context
cannot be easily transferred to a developing country such as Indonesia,
where lawn watering is not usual. Espey et al. (1997) report in a recent
survey of the literature that they found elasticities between –0.02 and
–3.33, averaging –0.51. We conclude therefore that our estimate is rather
high compared with what most of the studies find, but is not exceptionally
high.
Another advantage that emerges when the product term is added is
that income effects are clearly positive. The income elasticity has a mean
of 0.049 and ranges between 0.046 and 0.052.5
The rather limited role of income in our estimation result may arise
from our considering only households that already have a PDAM
connection. The decision to have such a connection probably depends
strongly on income: to obtain a connection, an installation fee of about
Rp 200,000 must be paid. In reality, the figure may be considerably higher:
waiting lists are long, and in order to expedite a connection it is often
necessary to bribe PDAM employees.
The installation fee is rather high in relation to monthly expenses. It
would amount to at least the equivalent of Rp 2,500 per month (assuming
a 15% interest rate), and this would more than double the cost of water
to a household consuming at a low level of 10 m3/month. For the median
household (in terms of water consumption), the installation fee would
still be some 40% of total water-related expenditures. This high fee is one
reason households may decide to cooperate with their neighbours by
having only one connection for two or more households.
One would expect a positive correlation between the income level of
households and whether they have a PDAM connection, because many
low-income households will not be able to afford the fixed costs involved.
In addition, one would expect supply from the water network to be
limited in areas with many low-income households.
These considerations make the discussion of equity in the pricing of
water services somewhat artificial. It is strange that, after charging a high
installation fee which functions as a barrier against low-income
households becoming connected, the companies use equity
considerations to come up with a progressive price structure.
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83Block Rate Pricing of Water in Indonesia: An Analysis of Welfare Effects
In the present paper we did not analyse the impact of the installation
fee on the decision about whether to be connected to the water network.
This decision depends on two factors: supply and demand. A household
can only be connected when two conditions are fulfilled: a pipeline is
present, and the household is interested in being connected. If a household
is not connected this may be a matter not of choice, but of the lack of a
pipeline. Unfortunately, data on ownership of a PDAM connection could
not be linked to data on the presence of a pipeline in the local area, so a
meaningful analysis of the decision to be connected was not feasible.
WELFARE EFFECTS OF UNIFYING THE RATE STRUCTURE
One justification that PDAMs give for the block rate pricing structure
relates to equity. The system favours households with small budgets
and—presumably—low water consumption, because the marginal price
is relatively low for small consumption levels. It appears from our
estimation results that income has a significant though small effect on
water consumption, whereas household size has a more substantial
influence. This implies that the main consequence of the current rate
structure may well be that larger households pay a higher marginal price
than small households do, but that income is an unimportant determinant
of the marginal price. Such an effect is almost surely unintended, and
probably not desired, by the authorities that determine the price schedule.
It is therefore of some interest to investigate the welfare consequences of
unifying the rate structure.
The appropriate tool for doing so is the expenditure function, or the
closely related indirect utility function. Either of these allows us to
determine the compensating variation, which is the change in income
that is required to keep a household at the same indifference curve after
a change in the price schedule for water has occurred. However, the
expenditure function and the indirect utility function that are associated
with the demand function estimated here are unknown, and the method
proposed by Hausman (1981) does not lead to an (easily) solvable
differential equation. We therefore make use of the procedure developed
by Vartia (1983), which requires only knowledge of the ordinary
(Marshallian) demand functions (see also Johansson 1991).6
An illustration of the outcome of the computation is given in
figure 2. Under the initial rate structure the household is at A, on the
steeper segment of the kinked budget constraint. A shift to a uniform
price per unit equal to the lower of the two initial water prices, with the
utility level kept constant, implies a move along the original indifference
curve to B, where the marginal rate of substitution equals the new
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84 Piet Rietveld, Jan Rouwendal and Bert Zwart
(relative) uniform price for water. The straight line that touches the
indifference curve at this point is the budget constraint that would lead
the utility maximising individual to choose B as the optimum
consumption bundle. The income implied by this budget line, y*
(measured in terms of the other good), is the income that would be needed
to make the consumer indifferent between the current rate structure and
the uniform price. The difference between actual income, y, and y* is the
compensating variation. If the compensating variation is negative—which
will be the case if the new uniform price is above a certain level—a higher
income will be needed to keep the consumer on the same indifference
curve after the rate structure is unified. If it is positive, as in the case
shown in figure 2, a lower income would suffice. Clearly, in the former
case the change is to the disadvantage of the household, in the latter to
its benefit.
FIGURE 2  Welfare Effect of Unifying the Price of Water
y
y*
Wk Water
Other
good
A
B
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 05
:44
 12
 A
ug
ust
 20
11
 
85Block Rate Pricing of Water in Indonesia: An Analysis of Welfare Effects
The uniform price can be set at various levels. As a first example we
consider the case that the uniform price is set equal to the current average
price paid by households (total revenue divided by total quantity
currently sold). This price equals Rp 263.40 per m3. The welfare effect on
households, measured in terms of the compensating variation, is given
in table 7. The aggregate effect of the uniform price is that total water
consumption increases: the fall in the number of households with low
consumption levels is more than offset by the increase in the number of
households with high consumption levels. The share of households that
consume more under the uniform price is 70%. Not all of these households
experience a welfare gain. As can be inferred easily from figure 2,
depending on the utility function of the household, an increase in water
consumption resulting from the change in price system can lead to both
a positive and a negative compensating variation). The share of
households with a positive compensating variation equals 38%, so the
majority of the households have a negative compensating variation. The
average welfare gain is positive, however. Thus, there is a rather large
group of households that experience a small welfare loss and a smaller
group of households that experience a relatively large welfare gain.
A comparison of the welfare effects for various household classes
yields interesting insights. The differences between the various income
groups are quite small. For example, when one compares the highest and
the lowest quartile, the shares of households that benefit from the uniform
price are quite similar (42% versus 38%), and the net benefit of the low-
income group is even higher than that of the high-income group. Our
analysis reveals that there is no systematic pattern according to which
high-income households benefit from the introduction of uniform prices.
This is an important conclusion, because it destroys the main argument
in favour of the prevailing price structure—the equity argument that high-
income households with high consumption levels should pay part of the
bill for low-income households. The main reason why the equity
mechanism does not work is that income is only weakly related to water
consumption, as has been demonstrated in tables 4 and 5.
A much more systematic pattern of effects is found when we consider
household size categories. Table 7 reveals a clear tendency for large
households to benefit more than small households do. For example, of
the smaller household groups only 15–25% are net beneficiaries of a
uniform price, whereas for the larger households the share varies between
50% and 70%. A similar pattern emerges when we consider the average
values of the net welfare effects: they are negative for small households
and clearly positive for large households. This can be seen from the results
in tables 4 and 5, where household size is a quite important explanatory
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86 Piet Rietveld, Jan Rouwendal and Bert Zwart
variable of water demand. Large households tend to consume more water
and will therefore gain from the introduction of a uniform price that is
lower than the current marginal price they pay. We conclude that the
progressive block rate system is beneficial for small households, but these are not
necessarily low-income households. As indicated in table 4, the correlation
between household size and household income is rather low.
TABLE 7  Welfare Effects of Unifying the Rate Structure:
Average Price Remains Unchanged
Net Share of Households with
Welfare
Effect Welfare Higher
Household Group Number (Rp/month)a Gain Demand
Uniform price Rp 263.40/m3
All households 220 347.39 .38 .70
By incomeb
First quartile 52 381.55 .38 .67
Second quartile 51 66.66 .29 .67
Third quartile 74 570.74 .41 .69
Fourth quartile 43 254.68 .42 .81
By household size
Single person 4 –233.17 .25 .50
Two persons 25 –101.94 .16 .40
Three persons 29 –212.63 .17 .52
Four persons 49 –137.09 .18 .59
Five persons 41 370.98 .51 .85
Six persons 32 1,018.27 .53 .91
Seven persons 16 1,147.02 .63 .81
Eight or more persons 24 1,110.17 .67 .92
Extra water source available?
Yes 20 492.84 .25 .45
No 200 332.85 .39 .73
aAverage compensating variation for the relevant group.
bDifferences in the number of households per quartile are due to a large number
of equal (reported) incomes.
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87Block Rate Pricing of Water in Indonesia: An Analysis of Welfare Effects
If the welfare analysis were carried out on the basis of individuals
instead of households, some results would change markedly. The
overrepresentation of large households in the group of households with
a positive net benefit implies, for example, that if the individual were the
unit a much higher number of units would have net benefits: whereas
38% of households have a welfare gain, more than 50% of individuals would
have a welfare gain.
The effect of the availability of an extra water source is somewhat
unexpected: households with an extra water source have a higher net
welfare gain than other households. The probable explanation is that the
households with an extra source are often large households.
The results in table 7 are confined to direct welfare effects related to
the consumption of water. Another effect to be considered concerns the
profit of the water company. Given the economies of scale, increased water
consumption can probably be realised against rather low marginal costs.
Although we do not know the level of the marginal costs, it is quite
possible that they are lower than the uniform price posited here. The
consequence would be an increase in the profits of the water company,
which would be used for public expenditures from which the households
would benefit. Thus the figures in table 7 probably contain underestimates
of the net welfare changes.
Since we do not know the marginal cost of water production, it is not
possible to use this as a benchmark in our welfare analysis. Another level
of the uniform price that is of some interest in this study is the level
where aggregate demand would remain unchanged. This level is
estimated to be Rp 296.1 per m3. The advantage of using this price level
for the analysis of the profits of the water company is that data on costs
are not needed (they remain unchanged). Thus the increase in profits of
the PDAM equals the increase in total receipts. Since PDAM profits flow
to the public sector, it is ultimately the households that benefit from the
profit increase. For the purpose of our computation we assume that the
extra profits are distributed equally over the households connected to
the water system. Government policy is that the profits of water
companies are used for public provisions that benefit the whole
population. This means that a part of these additional profits will be spent
in favour of households not connected to the water pipeline. It is difficult
to assess the effects of such expenditures, and we have taken the
redistribution of the additional profits among connected households as
a kind of benchmark. Actual benefits may be lower or higher than the
figures we computed, depending on the way the additional profits are
spent.
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Table 8 shows that with a price level where total demand remains
unchanged, 37% of all households will consume more water, and the rest
will consume the same amount or less. There is a net welfare gain to 35%
of households. The average net welfare effect is positive: compared with
table 7, the compensating variation decreases because of the higher price,
TABLE 8  Welfare Effects of Unifying the Rate Structure:
Total Demand Remains Unchanged
Net Share of Households with
Welfare
Effect Welfare Higher
Household Group Number (Rp/month)a Gain Demand
Uniform price Rp 296.09/m3
All households 220 207.79 .35 .37
By incomeb
First quartile 52 235.00 .38 .38
Second quartile 51 36.83 .29 .29
Third quartile 74 369.51 .36 .41
Fourth quartile 43 99.35 .33 .42
By household size
Single person 4 –106.38 .25 .25
Two persons 25 31.41 .16 .16
Three persons 29 –82.25 .17 .17
Four persons 49 –68.72 .18 .18
Five persons 41 146.98 .44 .51
Six persons 32 597.02 .50 .53
Seven persons 16 655.86 .56 .63
Eight or more persons 24 645.12 .58 .67
Extra water source available?
Yes 20 425.46 .20 .25
No 200 186.02 .36 .39
aSee table 7, note a.
bSee table 7, note b.
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but households benefit from higher public expenditures made possible
by the increased profits of the water company. Since we assume that these
public expenditures are distributed equally among households, it is no
surprise that the change in welfare position of the large households is
smaller with the higher than with the lower price (compare tables 8 and
7). For the rest, the distributional patterns related to the two uniform
prices are rather similar.
Tables 7 and 8 show two examples in which the transition from the
progressive price structure to the uniform price is welfare improving for
the average consumer. This is consistent with the suggestion above that
a progressive price system performs badly in terms of efficiency, because
it leads to a loss of consumer surplus among households with high water
demand. The tables also show that the social equity effects of the change
in price structure are limited. The shifts in the welfare positions of income
groups are relatively small. For household size groups the shifts are much
larger, but this is not a sensitive issue from an equity viewpoint, since
size is not closely correlated with income.
One might of course consider other uniform prices, possibly in
combination with a fixed access charge per month, not dependent on
consumption. For an assessment of the equity aspects of pricing, this will
not add much to the insights already obtained in tables 7 and 8. And for
an analysis of the efficiency of other uniform prices we would need data
on the marginal costs of water supply. Note also that, since the present
price system already contains a fixed installation fee, it does not make
much sense to add a fixed monthly access charge, because the two are
entirely interchangeable.
A final point that deserves attention is that in our empirical analysis
we did not consider the decision of households to be connected to the
water system. This decision obviously depends on both the fixed
installation fee and the marginal price of water. Changes in price policies
will have an impact not only on the welfare position of the households
already connected, but also on the decision of other households about
whether to be connected. The high installation fee for a connection to the
water system must be a barrier to connection for many low-income
households. This suggests that if equity is an important issue in PDAM
pricing policy, cross-subsidisation of low-volume users is not the most
obvious approach. Two alternative paths are more promising in this
respect. The first is to reduce the access charge so that water supply
becomes more accessible to low-income groups. The second would be to
expand the network so that more households that wish to be connected
indeed have this opportunity.
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CONCLUSIONS
The majority of Indonesian households do not have an own connection
to piped water. Substantial resources would be needed for large-scale
investments in this sector. Private sector involvement has been
insignificant in Indonesia’s water supply thus far. A bottleneck for private
sector involvement appears to be the structure and level of water prices.
The progressive price structure being used leads to cross-subsidies
between households with large and small consumption levels.
A two-part pricing structure with a uniform price equal to the
marginal cost of production, combined with a fixed access charge, would
lead to an efficient allocation. A progressive price structure cannot be
made compatible with the efficiency criterion, but it might outperform
the two-part price structure from an equity viewpoint. We therefore focus
in this paper on equity considerations. We note that installation costs
present a barrier to poor households. Thus the price structure of the
PDAMs becomes a strange mixture of progressive and regressive
elements: it is difficult to understand why equity considerations suddenly
matter in pricing policy after households have been charged a high
installation fee which discourages poor households from obtaining a
PDAM connection.
In order to address the equity issue, we first estimate the demand
functions for water. The estimation results indicate a large price elasticity
(in absolute value) and a small income elasticity. The price elasticity is
decreasing in income (in absolute value). The average price elasticity is
about –1.17. Our analysis shows that replacing the block rate structure
with a uniform marginal price leads on average to an increase in
household welfare. The principal beneficiaries of a uniform price are large
households. Differences among income groups are small, however.
We conclude that, in the case of Salatiga, the block rate structure does
not reach its aim of helping the poor. Instead, it appears to favour small
households, and these include both poor and rich. The contribution of
the present price structure to social equity is very limited. In view of the
potential efficiency gains achievable with a uniform price, a reformulation
of price policies in that direction is called for. Two main paths can be
identified that would improve equity in water supply. The first entails
the use of the profits of PDAMs to broaden access by reducing installation
costs. The second would be the reinvestment of PDAM profits into the
expansion of the network, to reduce the number of households that would
like to be connected but live in a zone where there is no piped water
system.
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NOTES
* The authors are grateful to Prapto Yuwono and Supramono for useful advice
and for making the data available. They also thank two anonymous referees
for constructive comments. André Oosterman provided background
information on PDAMs.
1 This result holds true with first degree price discrimination, where the supplier
has perfect knowledge of each consumer’s willingness to pay. When there is
no such perfect information, efficiency and profit maximisation usually do
not go together (Varian 1989).
2 A possible additional reason for the choice of price structure relates to the
objective of promoting economical water use by households: the high price
for large volumes stimulates them to reduce consumption. Such a consideration
arises in the pricing policies of public utilities in some countries, but in
Indonesia, where environmental issues generally receive low policy priority,
it probably does not play a role.
3 Consumers pay through the leader of their community, and the price is lower
than would be paid for an ordinary connection.
4 Details of the econometric analysis are available from the authors on request;
contact <prietveld@econ.vu.nl>.
5 The mean income elasticity is defined as the income elasticity for the mean
marginal price observed in the sample.
6 In our case, the system of demand functions consists of two equations: one for
water, the other for a (Hicksian) composite consumption good. All conditions
required by Vartia’s method are met if the demand equation for water meets
the Slutsky condition. A proof is available upon request from the authors. The
method we use yields a slightly more accurate estimation of the compensating
variation than the alternative method of Willig (1976).
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